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tices [of] a closed society,” stating, in par-
ticular, that this should be demonstrated
concretely by the broadening of exchanges
and in our agreement to the sale of bourgois
newspapers on the streets of Moscow.
Replying to Ball, A.I. Mikoyan said,
that so long as the arms race continues, it is
impossible and unrealistic to demand the
open society of which Ball spoke. You also
do not have an open society. You have more
advertising [reklam], but society is closed,
but in its own way. When the arms race is
eliminated and disarmament takes place, we
will then open many places in which the
presence today of foreigners is forbidden.
Then we will have open exchanges and con-
tacts.
Wishing to draw Heller, the Chairman
of the President’s Council of Economic
Advisers, into the conversation (he appears
pleasant, a relatively young professor, for
the most part silent), A.I. Mikoyan asked
Heller how he would explain the fact that,
in particular, the USA has more steel pro-
ducing potential than the USSR, but the
USSR in the third quarter of this year pro-
duced more steel than the USA. “If you did
not need so much steel, why build so many
factories and remove huge amounts of capi-
tal from circulation, including the living
work force [that has become] unemployed.
In general, what measures are you taking to
remove such disproportions and are they
removable at all in a free enterprise system?”
Heller avoided answering by changing
the topic of conversation, not wishing to
enter an argument where he felt himself
weak. A.I. Mikoyan in the context of the
dinner did not insist on an answer.
Heller promptly supported Mikoyan’s
statement on the appropriateness of trans-
ferring power and means freed up by the
end of the arms race toward raising the stan-
dard of living of the people from underde-
veloped countries and of the people of the
states participating in the arms race.
ticed the positive role you, the president’s
brother, played during the confidential ne-
gotiations between the president and the
head of the Soviet state. Of course, we un-
derstand, that you did this, as did we, in the
interests of one’s own country, one’s own
people. It was important, however, that you
understood correctly, in the critical moment,
what those interests were. Let us now com-
plete the outlined resolution to the Cuban
question, without complicating it with trivial
formal cavils [melochnaia pridirka], or even
worse, some deviation from the agreement
on the final settlement of this question. In-
deed, if one speaks the truth, there’s not
much left to do; it is only necessary to put
in writing or to finalize, without excessive
procrastination that which the American side
obligated itself to do during the exchange
of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and
the president.
R. Kennedy noted that he agreed that
little of essence remained to be done - in-
deed, “it’s 90 percent done,” although there
are still difficulties that must be overcome.
But he, R. Kennedy, did not intend to ana-
lyze these difficulties. They were the sub-
ject of detailed discussion in New York. He
only wanted to emphasize briefly that with
which he began: the importance of further
developing mutual understanding between
the president and N.S. Khrushchev. This will
determine to a large extent the success and
solution of other questions that still await
settlement.
A.I. Mikoyan agreed with this. Return-
ing to his conversation with the president,
A.I. Mikoyan said, that although in its course
there were a few sharp [ostryi] moments,
on the whole he agrees with R. Kennedy’s
evaluation of the conversation with the
president.
To all appearances, this was reflected
in the ensuing conversation with Rusk,
which took place in a business-like and
friendly atmosphere, clearly, not without the
influence of the president. R. Kennedy
smiled, but he didn’t say anything.
In concluding the conversation, R.
Kennedy asked [Mikoyan] to give greetings
to N.S. Khrushchev. In his turn A.I. Mikoyan
sent greetings to the president.
Robert Kennedy showed interest in
visiting the Soviet Union and expressed this
desire.
A.I. Mikoyan said that this was a good
idea and completely realizable. If the de-
336 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
circled over the vessel six times and then
flew away.
3. The ship “Krasnograd” left from the
port of Mariel on 6 December at 7:30, car-
rying on board 15 IL-28 planes.
This vessels was also constantly sub-
jected to overhead flights by American
planes whose numbers were recorded by us.
One plane of the “Orion” class, number
5605-BF-505, and two planes of the “Nep-
tune” class, numbers LK-131499 and JP-22,
asked the captain how many IL-28 planes
he was carrying. The captain answered that
there were 15 “IL-28” planes on board.
The flights over vessels carrying IL-
28’s continue. The vessels are proceeding
normally.
All the planes, 42 units, have been re-
moved. According to the Ministry of De-
fense, a forty-third plane (an instructional
model) was wrongly registered, and had
never been received by Cuba.
The Minister of the Merchant Fleet
V. BAKAEV
[Source: Russian State Economic Archives,
Moscow; copy provided to CWIHP by R.
Pikhoia and on file at National Security
Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by
John Henriksen, Harvard University.]
Official note from the US embassy in
Moscow to USSR Foreign Ministry,
10 December 1962
Received by mail
10 December 1962
Translated from the English
No. 478
The Embassy of the United States of
America is expressing its respect to the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of So-
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